What is commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, regarded as representing a unitary Copenhagen point of view, differs significantly from Bohr's complementarity interpretation, which does not employ wave packet collapse in its account of measurement and does not accord the subjective observer any privileged role in measurement. It is argued that the Copenhagen interpretation is an invention of the mid-1950s, for which Heisenberg is chiefly responsible, various other physicists and philosophers, including Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson, and Popper, having further promoted the invention in the service of their own philosophical agendas.
Copenhagen point of view on interpretation was, it shall be argued, a post-war invention, for which Heisenberg was chiefly responsible. Many other physicists and philosophers, each with his own agenda, contributed to the promotion of this invention for polemical or rhetorical purposes.
The list includes David Bohm, Paul Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson, and, most importantly, Karl Popper. Understanding the motivations of these actors will carry us a long way toward understanding how views so alien to Bohr could have been foisted upon him. Disentangling Bohr's views from the views of those who claimed to speak on his behalf and understanding what complementarity really involves are important, now, because new interest in Bohr and complementarity is being evinced in two different arenas. One arena is that of history. Two recent books, especially, have awakened serious scholarly interest in the history of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Both James Cushing (1994) and Mara Beller (1999) stress the role of social and institutional context in explaining the triumph of a Copenhagen point of view that the authors, themselves, find intrinsically uncompelling. Each takes as given the existence of a unitary Copenhagen view on interpretation, and neither is flattering to Bohr. More sympathetic to Bohr are Catherine Chevalley (1991 and 1994) and Jan Faye (1991 and 2002) .
But, while recognizing a diversity of voices within the Copenhagen community, they too employ the "Copenhagen" designation for a cluster of shared ideas.
Contemporary research in the foundations of quantum mechanics is another arena where Bohr draws attention, complementarity being seen as, perhaps, holding the key to an interpretation that might work, as it must, in the context of quantum field theory Halvorson 1999, Halvorson 2002) . It is noteworthy that some of those deploying complementarity in foundations research have been led, themselves, to take the historical turn (Clifton and Halvorson 2002 and Dickson 2001 . But here again, understanding the complementarity interpretation is complicated by decades of folklore about Bohr's ideas.
Subjectivity or Entanglement? Bohr's Philosophy of Complementarity.
Central to the popular image of the Copenhagen interpretation is the idea that observation-induced wave packet collapse is a mode of dynamical evolution unique to measurement interactions. If one regards measurement interactions as thus different in kind from other physical processes, one easily convinces oneself that the observer plays an active role in the quantum domain unlike the detached observer of classical physics, which view opens the door to the subjectivism also assumed to be part of the Copenhagen interpretation, the post-measurement state of the system being held to depend crucially on the state of the observer's knowledge.
Here, already, is a clue that the Copenhagen interpretation bears only a tenuous relationship to Bohr's complementarity interpretation, for Bohr never mentioned wave packet collapse nor did he accord the observer in his or her subjective aspect any fundamental role. Bohr was always careful to physicalize the "observer," preferring locutions such as "agencies of observation" to emphasize the fact that whatever was novel about observations in quantum mechanics was consequent upon measurement's being just another species of physical interaction.
What was novel about measurement for Bohr was that, as in any other quantum interaction, the post-measurement joint state of the object plus the measuring apparatus is entangled. Bohr did not employ the term, "entanglement," but consider a famous early statement of the point at the heart of the complementarity interpretation, this from Bohr's 1927 Como lecture:
The quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation. . . . This situation has far-reaching consequences. On one hand, the definition of the state of a physical system, as ordinarily understood, claims the elimination of all external disturbances. But in that case, according to the quantum postulate, any observation will be impossible, and, above all, the concepts of space and time lose their immediate sense.
On the other hand, if in order to make observation possible we permit certain interactions with suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to the system, an unambiguous definition of the state of the system is naturally no longer possible, and there can be no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word. The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the idealization of observation and definition respectively. (Bohr [1927 (Bohr [ ] 1934 Much in this passage calls for comment. Notice, first, that Bohr does not endorse the anti-realism often attributed to him. He does not say that one cannot ascribe reality to quantum phenomena, only that one cannot ascribe an "independent reality" to the phenomena or to the "agencies of observation." His point is that, since the object and the apparatus form an entangled pair, they cannot be accorded distinct, separate realities. The emphasis is on the word "independent," not the word "reality."
Second, the version of complementarity here introduced, between "space-time coordination" and the "claim of causality," engenders confusion on the part of both those who, failing to hear the Kantian echoes in Bohr's vocabulary, find the idea inherently obscure and those who want to convict Bohr of changing his mind after the EPR paper's employment of indirect measurements (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935) supposedly forced him to abandon a disturbance analysis of measurement. The latter argue that Bohr replaced talk of complementarity between "space-time coordination" and the "claim of causality" with talk of complementarity between conjugate observables. But Bohr never endorsed a disturbance analysis of measurement and so could not have changed his mind. Bohr always criticized Heisenberg for promoting the disturbance analysis, arguing that while indeterminacy implies limitations on measurability, it is grounded in "limitations on definability" (Bohr [1927] I was quite prepared to learn that our proposed point of view about the independence of the quantum process in separated atoms would turn out to be wrong. . . . Not only were Einstein's objections very disquieting; but recently I have also felt that an explanation of collision phenomena, especially Ramsauer's results on the penetration of slow electrons through atoms, presents difficulties to our ordinary space-time description of nature similar in kind to the those presented by the simultaneous understanding of interference phenomena and a coupling of changes of state of separated atoms by radiation. In general, I believe that these difficulties exclude the retention of the ordinary space-time description of phenomena to such an extent that, in spite of the existence of coupling, conclusions about a possible corpuscular nature of radiation lack a sufficient basis. (Bohr 1984, p. 79) As the concluding sentence makes clear, Bohr's famous skepticism about the photon concept concerned mainly the mutual independence seemingly implied by the corpuscular picture.
How did Bohr get from entanglement to complementarity? The route lies through another famous idea, Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts (see Howard 1994) . Here is a succinct statements of the first crucial steps in the argument:
The elucidation of the paradoxes of atomic physics has disclosed the fact that the unavoidable interaction between the objects and the measuring instruments sets an absolute limit to the possibility of speaking of a behavior of atomic objects which is independent of the means of observation.
We are here faced with an epistemological problem quite new in natural philosophy, where all description of experience has so far been based on the assumption, already inherent in ordinary conventions of language, that it is possible to distinguish sharply between the behavior of objects and the means of On the other hand, it is equally important to understand that just this circumstance implies that no result of an experiment concerning a phenomenon which, in principle, lies outside the range of classical physics can be interpreted as giving information about independent properties of the objects. (Bohr [1938 (Bohr [ ] 1958 my italics.) As Bohr explained in many essays, objectivity requires "unambiguous communicability," which means ascribing definite properties to individual objects, a mode of description inherent in ordinary language and definitive of "classical" physics. But object-instrument entanglement renders a "classical," disentangled description impossible. What to do?
Bohr's answer is that, in the quantum domain, when one speaks of a "phenomenon," one uses that term "exclusively to refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experimental arrangement" (Bohr [1949 (Bohr [ ] 1958 and that in describing such quantum phenomena one deploys a "classical" physical description, which involves also one's introducing a "cut," the distinction between object and measuring instrument seemingly disallowed by their forming an entangled pair (see, e.g., Bohr 1961, 78) .
Understanding how the contextualized notion of quantum phenomena makes possible our disentangling the object and the instrument requires our first dispelling two additional confusions.
First, in stressing the importance of specifying the total experimental context, Bohr was not endorsing operationalism. Electron momentum is not defined by a procedure for measuring momentum; instead, one is permitted to speak of the electron's having a definite momentum only in a specified experimental context. Second, in coupling an object-instrument "cut" with a "classical" account of the measurement, Bohr did not assert that one describes "classically" all of and only that which stands on the instrument side of the cut. Instead, Bohr asserted that one describes "classically" those degrees of freedom of both instrument and object that are coupled in the measurement. If one is measuring an electron's momentum, one describes "classically" both the electron's momentum and, say, the recoil momentum of a test body. Bohr did not introduce an instrument-object dualism, instruments being described "classically," objects of measurement being described quantum mechanically. What he meant was something more subtle.
What Bohr meant by a "classical" description was not a description in terms of classical mechanics or electrodynamics. It was, instead, a description wherein one assumes that object and instrument are separable, that they do not form an entangled pair. But since they do form an entangled pair, how is such a "classical" description possible?
What I think Bohr meant is this (see Howard 1979 Howard , 1994 : Given a pure state correctly describing any system, including a joint system consisting of an entangled instrument-object pair, and given an experimental context, in the form of a maximal set of comeasureable observables, one can write down a mixture that gives for all observables in that context exactly the same statistical predictions as are given by the pure state. But then, with respect to the observables measurable in that context, one proceeds as if the instrument and object were not entangled. One can speak as if the measurement reveals a property of the object alone, and one can regard the statistics as ordinary ignorance statistics, the experiment being taken to reveal a definite, though previously unknown value of the parameter in question.
One short step now to complementarity, for the mutually incompatibility of the experimental contexts for measuring conjugate observables implies that different contextualized (Heisenberg 1955, 12) . About the latter, he says: "What was born in Copenhagen in 1927 was not only an unambiguous prescription for the interpretation of experiments, but also a language in which one spoke about Nature on the atomic scale, and in so far a part of philosophy" (1955, 16 ).
Heisenberg's characterization of this interpretation is, in part, a perceptive presentation of some of subtleties in Bohr's complementarity interpretation and, in part, an insinuation of his own rather different views. What he gets right is the need to describe the instrument-object pair by means of a mixture in order to be able to represent the object as possessing objective real properties, but already here he insinuates his subjectivist reading of quantum mechanics.
A closed system, says Heisenberg, can be represented as a pure case, which is an "objective" description because it is not "connected with the observer's knowlege," but since the state function is defined in configuration space, not three space, this representation is "abstract," "incomprehensible," and "contains no physics at all." How does it become physics?
The representation becomes a part of the description of Nature only by being linked to the question of how real or possible experiments will result. From this point we must take into consideration the interaction of the system with the measuring apparatus and use a statistical mixture in the mathematical representation of the larger system composed of the system and the measuring apparatus. (1955, 26) But, says Heisenberg, one employs a mixture to describe the instrument-object pair only because the measuring apparatus must, in turn, be connected with the "external world" for its behavior to be "capable of being registered as something actual." When the observer registers an actual measurement result, "he thereby alters the mathematical representation discontinuously, because a certain one among the various possibilities has proved to be the real one." This discontinuous change corresponds to the "reduction of wave-packets" (1955, 27) . Dependence upon the observer's registration of a result is analogous to the selection of a virtual ensemble in which to include a system in Gibbsian statistical mechanics, a mode of description that also "contains information about the extent of the observer's knowledge of the system" and thus contains a "subjective" element (1955, 26) . Thanks to this privileging of the observer's knowledge, "such concepts as 'objective reality' have no immediately evident meaning, when they are applied to the situation which one finds in atomic physics" (1955, 23 ).
Heisenberg's advocating a subjectivist interpretation of quantum mechanics was nothing new in 1955, nor was the conflation of his views with Bohr's or philosophical exploitation of the resulting mix. Already by the mid-1930s, physicist friends of logical empiricism, such as Philipp Frank (1932 , [1936 ] 1950 ) and Pascual Jordan (1936a , 1936b , cited Heisenberg on the role of the observer in order to claim quantum mechanics as yet another scientific vindication of verificationism and a consequent disavowal of questions about atomic reality as ill posed.
Frank was the more careful and accurate of the two, Jordan the more forthright propagandist on behalf of a "positivistic" epistemology, which is, he wrote in a widely-used text book, "the overall epistemological viewpoint that finds expression in the modern quantum theory," from which it derives "its most significant support." Positivism, wrote Jordan, is "the epistemological viewpoint of Bohr and Heisenberg" (Jordan 1936a, vii) . But it was Heisenberg (1934) , not Bohr, whom Jordan cited when explaining that "the act of observation is what first creates the definiteness" in an observed quantity (1936a, 308), from which circumstance follows a "radical disavowal" of the "classical representation of reality" (1936a, 309). Bohm was once an articulate friend of what he took to be Bohr's interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohm 1951) , but by the mid-1950s he was perhaps the most threatening critic of quantum orthodoxy with his revival of de Broglie's pilot-wave hypothesis in a new, technically more adept hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics (Bohm 1952 (Bohm , 1957a ). After the turn, Bohm seized upon Heisenberg's version of a Copenhagen interpretation for legitimating his hidden variables program by contrasting its objectivism and realism with the alleged Copenhagen absurdities of observer-induced wave packet collapse and the subjectivism that follows therefrom (see, e.g., Bohm 1957b), a move that becomes a standard rhetorical strategy in all subsequent apologetics for Bohmian mechanics (see, e.g., Cushing 1994).
Feyerabend published an important, not at all unsympathetic review of Bohm's Causality and Chance in Modern Physics (1957a ) in 1960 (see also Feyerabend 1957 . That the choice between Bohmian hidden variable theory and Copenhagen orthodoxy is empirically undecidable was grist for Feyerabend's mill when his program of epistemological anarchism was in gestation (Feyerabend 1973) , and thus representing the choice between Bohm and "Bohr" (i.e., Heisenberg) as illustrating the limitations of an empirical algorithm for theory choice becomes a standard trope in the anti-empiricist literature from Thomas Kuhn forward (see Beller 1997 ).
Hanson was another important critic of empiricism and precursor of Kuhn. He was drawn to Heisenberg's Copenhagen interpretation, but in a manner different from Feyerabend. What especially interested Hanson was Heisenberg's argument that quantum mechanics, properly interpreted, constitutes a "closed theory," one systematically insulated against refutation by experiments within its intended phenomenal domain (Heisenberg 1948; see Hanson 1958 see Hanson , 1959 .
Foreshadowed here is an important feature of the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm (see Beller 1999, 294-300) .
But it was Popper, an old critic of quantum orthodoxy (Popper 1934a (Popper , 1934b , who did more than anyone else, starting in the late 1950s, to cement in the popular mind the idea that Bohr and Heisenberg were together committed to a subjectivist interpretation of quantum mechanics. The Copenhagen interpretation was a foil for advancing Popper's own program, both his realist, "objectivist" alternative to anti-realist, positivist inductivism and his objective propensity interpretation of quantum mechanical probabilities (Popper 1957 (Popper , 1959 (Popper , 1967 (Popper , 1982 .
Here is how he begins his most influential essay on the topic: This is an attempt to exorcize the ghost called "consciousness" or "the observer" from quantum mechanics, and to show that quantum mechanics is as "objective" a theory as, say, classical statistical mechanics. . . . The opposite view, usually called the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, is almost universally accepted. In brief it says that "objective reality has evaporated", and that quantum mechanics does not represent particles, but rather our knowledge, our observations, or our consciousness of particles. (Popper 1967, 7) Bohr is named as the possibly fearsome defender of Copenhagen orthodoxy, but, as is the case with every one of Popper's other such characterizations of the Copenhagen opposition, the only citation given to ground this portrayal of the Copenhagen interpretation is to a paper of Heisenberg's (1958) . According to our critics, the epistemological point of view of quantum theory undermines the sound belief in the reality of the external world, in which all physical thinking is rooted, and opens the door the barren doctrine of positivism. . . . This picture would be alarming if it were true. However, it is just another dream, a nightmare perhaps, of our critics. . . . It is based on the most futile casuistics: the critics diligently excerpt from the writings in which the principles of quantum theory are discussed isolated sentences on which they put arbitrary interpretations. No wonder that they should find . . . some difficulty in "understanding Bohr": which, incidently, does not prevent them from branding him as a positivist. There is no difficulty, at any rate, in understanding the critics' philosophy and exposing its unscientific character. (1957, 43) 4. Conclusion. Until Heisenberg coined the term in 1955, there was no unitary Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. There was a group of thinkers united by the determination to defend quantum mechanics as a complete and correct theory, a group whose members shared what many of them called the "Copenhagen spirit." They agreed that indeterminacy, complementarity, and entanglement were important lessons of the quantum theory, lessons whose import went beyond simple empirical claims to a revision in our thinking about how physical theories represent natural phenomena. But they did not all believe that quantum mechanics entailed observer-induced wave packet collapse, a privileged role for the observer, subjectivism, or positivism. Heisenberg and Bohr, in particular, disagreed for decades about just these issues. That Heisenberg succeeded in convincing us otherwise is unfortunate. It is time to dispel the myth.
